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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois
appellate courts addressed a variety of labor law topics. The Illinois courts considered such issues as retaliatory discharge,' workers compensation, 2 and employment discrimination 3 . Applicable
legislation also is reviewed in this article.
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; A.B., 1972, Wellesley College; J.D., 1978, Drake University Law School.
** B.A., 1984, Lake Forest College; J.D. candidate, 1988, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. See infra notes 4-59 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 60-94 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 110-25 and accompanying text.
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RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

The common law doctrine that an employer may discharge an
employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason continues to be
the law in Illinois.4 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has recognized the tort of retaliatory discharge as a limited exception to
the employee-at-will doctrine.' To succeed in a retaliatory discharge action, the employee must prove that the employer discharged him in retaliation for his activities, and that this discharge
was in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy.6 The
scope and application of the retaliatory discharge cause of action
was questioned in several Illinois Supreme Court decisions during
the Survey year.
A.

Scope

In Gould v. Campbell's Ambulance Service, Inc.,7 the supreme

court held that the discharge of at-will city ambulance employees
for reporting that a co-worker was not properly licensed as required by a local home rule ordinance' did not violate a clearly
mandated public policy. On the date of the plaintiffs' discharge,
there was no state statute purporting to set standards for ambu4. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (1985).
5. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The tort of retaliatory
discharge was first recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court in Kelsay. The Kelsay court
held that the Workers Compensation Act established a strong public policy, and that this
policy would be frustrated if workers could be discharged for exercising their rights under
the Act. Kelsay, 74 Ill.2d at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357. Additionally, the court determined
that punitive damages may be properly awarded in future retaliatory discharge actions.
Id. at 187, 384 N.E.2d at 359-60.
6. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 134, 421 N.E.2d 876, 881
(1981). In Palmateer,the court discussed the troublesome problem of determining what
constitutes a "clearly mandated public policy." In an attempt to provide an analytical
framework, the court stated that "public policy concerns what is right and just and affects
the citizens of the [s]tate collectively." Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878. This public policy
is found in the state's constitution, statutes, and judicial decisions. Id. Although there is
"no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject of public policies
from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other states involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities before the tort will be allowed." Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79. According to the Palmateer court, "[t]he cause of action is allowed where the public policy
is clear, but is denied where it is equally clear that only private interests are at stake." Id.
at 131, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
7. 111 Ill. 2d 54, 488 N.E.2d 993 (1986).
8. ALTON, ILL., ORDINANCE, ch. 23, para. 4-23-8(C)(4) (1979). The City of Alton
ordinance provided that qualified ambulance attendants and drivers had to be certified as
emergency medical technicians by the state of Illinois or by other qualified professional
medical persons. Id.
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lance operations. Even though the city of Alton had its own ordinance concerning the necessary qualifications of ambulance
personnel, 9 the court reasoned that this local ordinance affected
only the citizens of Alton and was not indicative of a policy that
"affects the citizens of the state collectively."' 10 Therefore, the
plaintiffs did not prove a cause of action for retaliatory discharge."
In rejecting the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim in Price v.
Carmack Datsun, Inc., 2 the supreme court strictly applied the
holding of Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co.," 3 and ruled
that the discharge of an at-will employee for filing a claim under a
health insurance policy does not violate a clearly mandated public
policy. The Price court reasoned that a company-provided health
insurance plan is a private contractual matter between the plaintiff
and his employer."' Although the plaintiff had argued that the
health insurance provisions of the Illinois Insurance Code represent a public policy against the discharge of employees for filing
health insurance claims, the court stated that "the Code was
designed to govern operations of insurance companies, not insureds, such as the defendant."'" The fact that employers commonly provide group health insurance, the court held, does not
establish a clearly mandated public policy to provide them.' 6 The
Price court thus considered plaintiff's claim a private grievance
rather than one affecting the citizens of Illinois collectively.' 7
The supreme court continued its narrow interpretation of the
tort of retaliatory discharge in Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co..8 The
eight plaintiffs, formerly employed by the defendant as foremen at
the construction site of a nuclear power plant, alleged that they
were discharged because they had informed other employees of
layoff procedures being used by the defendant. They claimed that
various statutory and constitutional rights, including free speech,
due process, and privacy, were violated by their discharge. Plaintiffs asserted that these violations frustrated the public policy of
Illinois established by those statutory and constitutional provi9. Id.
10. Gould, 111I.
2d at 57-58, 488 N.E.2d at 995.
11. Id. at 58, 488 N.E.2d at 995.
12. 109 I11.2d 65, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985).
13. 85 I11.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
14. Price, 109 Ill. 2d at 69, 485 N.E.2d at 361.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 106 I11.2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985).
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sions.9 The supreme court dismissed the plaintiffs' retaliatory discharge claim, finding that the public policy clearly mandated by
the constitutional and statutory provisions cited in the plaintiffs'
complaint was restricted to governmental action limiting the rights
of an individual.20 The court found nothing in the cited provisions
indicating an established public policy affecting private employeremployee relationships. 21
In Mein v. Masonite Corp.,22 the supreme court upheld a determination that a claim of wrongful discharge based upon age discrimination does not constitute a cause of action in Illinois for
retaliatory discharge. The plaintiff did not dispute his classification as an employee-at-will who could be discharged at any time,
for any or for no cause, without his employer incurring any liability. Nevertheless, he claimed that he was discharged because of his
age, a violation of the public policy of Illinois prohibiting age discrimination. 23 In reviewing Mein's claim, the supreme court acknowledged that while the Illinois Human Rights Act 24 states a
public policy against age discrimination, it also contains comprehensive procedures to investigate and adjudicate alleged violations
of the Illinois Human Rights Act.25 In fact, the court determined
that the legislature intended the Act, with its comprehensive
scheme of remedies and administrative procedures, to be the exclusive source for age discrimination redress. 26 Thus, Mein could not
pursue an independent action for retaliatory discharge.27
B. FederalPreemption
Federal preemption of state court retaliatory discharge claims
was at issue in three Illinois cases during the Survey year. In
19. Id. at 523-24, 478 N.E.2d at 1355. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Barr claimed that
their discharge violated their right to freedom of speech, their right not to be deprived of
property without due process, their right to privacy of communications, and their right to
be free from either being enjoined or restrained from terminating the relation of employment or from peaceably persuading others to do so. Id.
20. Id. at 526, 478 N.E.2d at 1356.
21. Id. at 527, 478 N.E.2d at 1357.
22. 109 Ill. 2d 1, 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985).
23. Id. at 3-4, 485 N.E.2d at 313. Mein also filed a complaint with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (the "IDHR"). According to Mein, as a result of his IDHR
complaint, Masonite offered him reinstatement to his prior position which he rejected
because the defendant's conduct had "irreparably damaged" his ability to function as a
creative designer. Id.
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-102 to 9-102 (1985).
25. Mein, 109 Ill. 2d at 5, 485 N.E.2d at 314.
26. Id. at 7, 485 N.E.2d at 315.
27. Id.
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Beaird v. Miller's Mutual InsuranceAssociation,2 the Illinois Ap-

pellate Court for the Fifth District held that a complaint alleging
retaliatory discharge in violation of the right to participate in collective bargaining activities was preempted by federal statute. The
plaintiff claimed that he was fired because he tried to organize a
union of the defendant's insurance agents, an activity explicitly
29
protected by the National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA").
Relying upon the general rule of preemption stated by the United
States Supreme Court,3" the Illinois appellate court determined
that Beaird's organizational activities were protected by section 7

of the NLRA, and hence fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board. 3 ' Therefore, the court held
that the plaintiff's state court retaliatory discharge claim was
preempted.32
The Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
federal Railway Labor Act (the "RLA") 33 preempts an action for a
retaliatory discharge claim brought by an employee covered by the
RLA. In Koehler v. Illinois Central Gulf RailroadCo., 34 the plaintiff, a railroad worker, alleged that he was discharged in retaliation
for filing suit against the railroad pursuant to the Federal Employer's Liability Act (the "FELA"),3 5 which governs interstate
railroads in their capacity as employers. The Illinois Supreme
court in Koehler held that the state court tort action was preempted by the RLA.3 6 The Koehler court relied on the United
States Supreme Court decision in Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville
28. 133 Ill. App. 3d 670, 479 N.E.2d 374 (5th Dist. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1193 (1986).
29. Id. at 671, 479 N.E.2d at 375 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
30. Beaird, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 671, 479 N.E.2d at 376 (citing San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)). "When it is clear or may fairly be
assumed that the activities which a [s]tate purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act [29 U.S.C. § 157], or constitute an unfair labor practice
under § 8 [29 U.S.C. § 158], due regard for the federal enactment requires that state
jurisdiction must yield." Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244 (1959).
31. Beaird, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 671, 479 N.E.2d at 375-76 (citing Garmon, 359 U.S. at
244).
32. Beaird, 133 Ill. App. 3d at 672, 479 N.E.2d at 376.
33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982). The RLA has its own elaborate scheme for dispute
resolution. It does not accord original jurisdiction over employment-related disputes to
either federal or state courts. The National Railroad Adjustment Board has original jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Act. Decisions of the Adjustment Board are
final and binding and are accorded limited review in federal district court. See id.
34. 109 Ill. 2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 542 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3297 (1986).
35. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). The FELA imposes liability on railroad employers for
injuries to employees caused by an employer's negligence. Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 476, 488
N.E.2d at 544.
36. Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 479, 488 N.E.2d at 545.
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Railroad Co., in which the United States Supreme Court stated
that the RLA preempted state actions based on wrongful discharge
because the National Railroad Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims arising under the RLA.3 8
The court in Koehler rejected the plaintiff's attempt to distinguish his case on the grounds that it inv,6lved a retaliatory discharge that was tortious in nature rather than a wrongful discharge
based on a breach of an employment contract.39 Citing a Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals opinion for support, 4° the court determined that the exclusivity of the administrative remedy provided
by the RLA arises from the Act itself rather than from any contractual relationship between the parties.41 Moreover, the Koehler
court characterized retaliatory discharge as simply one type of
wrongful discharge. 42 Because the plaintiff's state law tort claim
was identical to the claim he would have made during his grievance proceeding under the RLA, the plaintiff's claim was
preempted.43
In one Illinois Supreme Court case decided during the Survey
year, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim was not preempted by federal law. 44 In
Wheeler v. CaterpillarTractor Co. ,4 the plaintiff asserted that he
was discharged in retaliation for his refusal to work with radioactive materials under conditions which allegedly exposed him to radiation hazards in violation of federal safety regulations governing
the handling of radioactive materials.
In reviewing Wheeler, the court acknowledged the extensive federal regulation of radioactive materials under the Atomic Energy
Act of 195446 and the clearly enunciated federal public policy con37. 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
38. Id. at 323-24.
39. Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 478, 488 N.E.2d at 545. In rejecting the plaintiff's distinction between wrongful discharge and retaliatory discharge, the Illinois court quoted the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Andrews: "[T]he compulsory character of the administrative remedy provided by the Railway Labor Act for disputes ... stems not from any
contractual undertaking between the parties but from the [a]ct itself." Id. (quoting Andrews, 406 U.S. 320, 323).
40. Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.'983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984).
41. Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 478-79, 488 N.E.2d at 545.
42. Id. at 478, 488 N.E.2d at 545 (citing Jackson, 717 F.2d at 1049).
43. Koehler, 109 Ill. 2d at 480, 488 N.E.2d at 546.
44. Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 511, 485 N.E.2d 372, 377
(1985), cert. denied 106 S. Ct. 1641 (1986).
45. 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1982).

Labor Law

1986]

cerning safety in connection with such materials."' The court
raised, sua sponte, the issue of preemption of the state tort action
by the comprehensive federal law. 48 Nevertheless, relying heavily
upon a United States Supreme Court decision,49 the Illinois
Supreme Court found that it was not inconsistent to vest the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with exclusive regulatory authority
over the safety aspects of nuclear development and at the same
time permit plaintiffs to recover for injuries caused by nuclear
hazards.50 Comparing the plaintiff in Wheeler to the plaintiff in
Palmateer, the court determined that the protection of the lives
and property of citizens from the hazards of radioactive material is
as important and fundamental as protecting them from crimes of
violence.5

Based on these safety considerations, the court recog-

nized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for refusing to
work under conditions contravening the public policy of safe use of
radioactive materials, 52 regardless of Wheeler's failure to file a
complaint with any federal agency.
C. Survivability
In Raisl v. Elwood Industries,Inc., the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District addressed the issue of the survivability of a
retaliatory discharge claim upon the death of the plaintiff, who had
filed suit seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. The
plaintiff died shortly after initiating a suit which alleged that she
had been fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation
claim. Relying upon prior expansive readings of the Illinois Survival Statute, 54 the court decided that compensatory damages for
retaliatory discharge constituted "personal property" within the
meaning of the survival statute. 5 This interpretation was reinforced under a second test: if the right asserted is assignable, it
survives the death of either party.5 6 Thus, the court held that an
action for retaliatory discharge seeking compensatory damages
does not abate upon the death of an employee.57
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Wheeler, 108 Ill. 2d at 506, 485 N.E.2d at 374-75.
Id. at 506, 485 N.E.2d at 375.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
Wheeler, 108 11. 2d at 509, 485 N.E.2d at 376.
Id. at 511, 485 N.E.2d at 377.
Id.
134 II. App. 3d 170, 479 N.E.2d 1106 (1st Dist. 1985).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 27-6 (1985).
Raisl, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 173, 479 N.E.2d at 1109.
Id.
Id.
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The court in Raisl also addressed the issue of the survivability of
the plaintiff's punitive damages claim by analyzing prior Illinois
Supreme Court decisions concerning the general issue of
survivability of a claim for punitive damages." The Raisl court
articulated a two-part test to determine whether a claim will survive the claimant's death: (1) whether there exists either a "statutory basis" for such claims or whether such claims are an "integral
component of the regulatory scheme and of the remedy which is
available under it," or, (2) whether "strong equitable considerations" advocate survival. The court concluded that both tests were
satisfied. Accordingly, the appellate court in Raisl held that the
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages predicated upon a retaliatory
discharge for seeking 9 workers' compensation benefits should not
5
have been dismissed.
III.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act," an injury is
compensable if it "arises out of and in the course of employment."6 "Arising out of" refers to the causal connection between
the employment and the accidental injury. This connection exists
when the injury's origin is in some way related to the employment.62 Two supreme court cases during the Survey year and one
appellate court decision addressed issues of whether the claimant's
injury arose out of and in the course of employment.
A.

Eligibility

In Hoffman v. Industrial Commission,63 the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that the Industrial Commission's finding that injuries
sustained during work hours by a "traveling employee" were not
compensable was not against the manifest weight of the evidence
or contrary to law and therefore, should be upheld. The plaintiff in
Hoffman was director of health services for a large school district,
a job which required her to use her own car to travel to the various
58. Id. (citing Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill.
2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983); National Bank v. Norfolk and Western Kentucky Ry. Co., 73 Ill. 2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919
(1978); Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.
2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975)).
59. Raisl, 134 Il1. App. 3d at 177, 479 N.E.2d at 1109.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 138.1-.30 (1985).
61. Id. at para. 138.2.
62. Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85, 481 N.E.2d 684, 687
(1985) (citing Scheffler Greenhouses Inc. v. Industrial Corm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361, 366, 362
N.E.2d 325, 327 (1977); Jewel Companies v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Ill. 2d 38, 40, 310
N.E.2d 12, 14 (1974)).
63. 109 Ill. 2d 194, 486 N.E.2d 889 (1985).
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schools within the district. The plaintiff injured her knee during
working hours while at a retail store buying a picnic table, benches,
and other supplies she needed to conduct a work-related meeting at
her home. She subsequently filed a workers' compensation claim.
The arbitrator awarded her medical expenses. The Industrial
Commission reversed this award.
The court noted that Hoffman was a traveling employee and that
courts generally are more liberal with such employees when deciding whether an injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Nevertheless, the Hoffman court held that traveling
employees must prove that an injury arose out of and in the course
of employment in order to be compensable under the Act. Applying the test set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court in Robinson v.
Industrial Commission,64 the court ruled that the injury was not
compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. 65 Hoffman's
injury was not foreseeable and she was not instructed, nor did she
have a duty, to go to the store to buy materials. Furthermore,
although the plaintiff was injured while buying materials to conduct a work-related meeting at her home, she also intended to keep
the materials for her own use and did not seek reimbursement.66
Considering these factors, the court ruled that it was permissible
for the Industrial Commission to find that the plaintiff's injuries
did not arise out of the course of her employment with the defendant school district.67
The decision in Peoria Co. Nursing Home v. IndustrialCommission, 6s represents an expansion of the types of injuries deemed compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. The Illinois
Appellate Court for the Third District (Industrial Commission Division) ruled that, despite the absence of a precise incident, clearly
identified by a court as an accident, an injury sustained as the result of work-related repetitive trauma is compensable under the
64. 96 Ill. 2d 87, 91, 449 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1983). The Robinson court held that the
Workers' Compensation Act was intended only to compensate those injuries which arise
out of (1) acts which an employee was instructed to perform by his employer, (2) acts
which he has a common law or statutory duty to perform while working, or (3) acts
which the employee might be reasonably expected to perform as part of his assigned
duties. Id.
65. Hoffman, 109 Ill. 2d at 200, 486 N.E.2d at 892.
66. Id. at 200-01, 486 N.E.2d at 892.
67. Id.
68. 138 Ill. App. 3d 880, 487 N.E.2d 356 (Industrial Comm'n Div., 3d Dist. 1985).
The court granted a request for a statement under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a),
declaring a substantial question which warrants supreme court consideration. Id. at 894,
487 N.E.2d at 366.
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Act.69
The claimant in Peoria suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome in
her wrist as a result of repeated trauma in operating two large
washing machines. While she was uncertain exactly when she began experiencing the symptoms of the injury, she sought medical
assistance on October 5, 1976. In determining that the plaintiff's
injury was compensable, the court rejected a previous holding that
either the cause or the effect of an injury or a disease must be traceable to a specific time, place, and cause before an employee could
recover under the Act.7 ° In abandoning this rule, the Peoria court
stated that its interpretation of "accident" reflected the purpose of
the Act and the reality of employees obligated to perform repetitive
tasks.7 '
The Peoriacourt's holding made necessary a determination as to
whether the claim was timely filed. 72 Noting the difficulty of ascertaining precisely when the statute of limitations should begin running in repetitive trauma cases, the court developed the following
test: when an employee in Illinois suffers a work-related injury due
to repeated trauma, the date of the
accidental injury is the date on
73
which the injury manifests itself.
B.

Exclusivity of Remedy

In Unger v. ContinentalAssurance Co. ,74 the supreme court held
that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act barred the plaintiff's common law medical malpractice action
against his employer and co-employee for an injury arising out of a
company-sponsored physical examination that failed to uncover a
malignancy. Both Dr. Hines, the physician who performed the examination, and the plaintiff were doctors employed by the Continental Assurance Company. The court determined that the
alleged injury was sustained "in the course of" plaintiff's employ69. Id. at 885, 487 N.E.2d at 360.
70. Id. at 884, 487 N.E.2d at 359. Previous case law stated that an injury is accidental within the meaning of the Act only if it is traceable to a definite time, place and cause.
Id. at 883, 487 N.E.2d at 359 (citing General Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ill.
2d 432, 433 N.E.2d 671 (1982)); International Harvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Ill. 2d
84, 305 N.E.2d 529 (1973). Those courts noted that "aggravation of a pre-existing disease was compensable under the Act where the employee's existing physical structure
gives way ... and he is suddenly disabled." Peoria, 138 Ill.App. 3d at 882-83, 487 N.E.2d
at 358.
71. Peoria, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 884, 487 N.E.2d at 359.
72. Id. at 886, 487 N.E.2d at 361.
73. Id. at 887, 487 N.E.2d at 361.
74. 107 Ill. 2d 79, 481 N.E.2d 684 (1985).

1986]

Labor Law

ment after determining that the examination occurred in a company clinic during working hours and was a necessary condition of
plaintiff's continued employment." Relying on an earlier Illinois
Supreme Court ruling that a claimant can establish compensability
by establishing that employment was one causative factor in the
resulting injury,76 the Unger court held that any injury stemming
from the negligence of Dr. Hines arose out of and in the course of
plaintiff's employment. 7 Therefore, pursuant to section 5(a) of
the Workers' Compensation Act, the exclusive remedy provision,
Unger's common law malpractice claim was barred.78
C. Survivors' Benefits
In A.0. Smith Corp. v. Industrial Commission,79 the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled that survivor's benefits must be determined
by the statutory rates in effect on the date of a decedent's death
rather than on the date of his work-related accident. The decedent
suffered compensable injuries on October 29, 1971, while employed
at A.O. Smith Corp.. He became comatose and died almost nine
years later on June 3, 1980. An arbitrator for the Industrial Commission found that A.O. Smith had paid the decedent compensation in excess of the survivor's benefits that would have been
payable under the statute in force on the date of his injury. The
arbitrator thus denied his dependents' claim for survival benefits.
Recognizing the distinction between a cause of action created in
favor of the employee for injuries suffered but not resulting in
death, and a cause of action created in favor of his dependents for
injuries resulting in death, the supreme court reversed the Commission's denial and awarded the dependents the full amount of
compensation determined under the Act in force on the date of the
decedent's death. 80
D. Recoupment
Two Illinois Supreme Court cases decided during the Survey
year reviewed situations in which the employer attempted to
recoup some of the payments made to an injured employee from
75. Id. at 87-89, 481 N.E.2d at 688-89.
76. Field Enterprises v. Industrial Comm'n, 37 Ill. 2d 335, 340, 226 N.E.2d 867, 870
(1967).
77. Unger, 107 Ill. 2d at 87-89, 481 N.E.2d at 688-89.
78. Id. at 84, 481 N.E.2d at 687 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5(a)
(1985)).
79. 109 Il. 2d 52, 485 N.E.2d 335 (1985).
80. Id. at 57, 485 N.E.2d at 338.

676

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 18

proceeds of third party tort actions. In Freer v. Hysan,8 ' the
supreme court ruled that it was proper for the circuit court to suspend an Industrial Commission's award at the end of a related
third-party action. In Freer, the plaintiff had been permanently injured at work when a drum of sewer solvent exploded and burned
his body. The Industrial Commission ordered his employer, the
Village of Glendale Heights, to pay to the plaintiff a weekly
amount for life, along with medical expenses as required by the
Act. The plaintiff then instituted a third-party action against the
manufacturer and distributor of the solvent. The Village intervened pursuant to section 5(b) of the Act to protect its right to a
lien on any award received by the plaintiff. When the third-party
action was settled for a large sum of money, the employer moved
for a suspension of payments in order to satisfy its lien on the proceeds of the settlement. Rejecting the plaintiff's position that the
issue should be remanded to the Industrial Commission, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted section 5(b) of the Act to impose a
duty upon the circuit court to protect the employer's statutory
lien. 2 The court thus held that the responsibility of protecting the
employer's reimbursement rights lies with the courts and not the
Industrial Commission.83
The supreme court again was called upon to interpret section
5(b) of the Act in J.L. Simmons Co., Inc. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 4 In J.L. Simmons, the court held that the realignment of
the employer as a co-plaintiff with the employee in a suit against a
third-party did not violate section 5(b) of the Act when the employer himself did not file the suit and when the employee did not
object to the joinder.85
E. Constitutionality
In Yellow Cab Co. v. Jones,8 6 the respondent challenged as unconstitutional Supreme Court Rules 22(g) and 315(a) which concern appeals of orders of the Industrial Commission. Rule 22(g)
provides for a five-judge panel of the appellate court to sit as the
Industrial Commission Division of the Illinois Appellate Court
hearing all appeals of the Industrial Commission orders.87 The re81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

108 Ill. 2d 421, 484 N.E.2d 1076 (1985).
Id. at 426, 484 N.E.2d at 1079.
Id.
108 Ill. 2d 106, 483 N.E.2d 273 (1985).
Id. at 114, 483 N.E.2d at 277.
108 Ill. 2d 330, 483 N.E.2d 1278 (1985).
ILL. S. CT. R. 22, 315(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, paras. 22, 315(a) (1985).
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spondent contended that because the judges are not selected from
the district in which the Division sits, the rule conflicts with article
VI of the. Illinois Constitution.88 The court in Yellow Cab responded that because there was no specific constitutional language
imposing such a limitation on the judiciary, Rule 22(g) was
constitutional. 89

Proceeding to the challenges to Rule 315(a), the court considered respondent's argument that the right to appeal, though not
mandatory, must be uniform and nondiscriminatory and that Rule
315(a) deprived litigants of their constitutional rights of equal protection and due process. Respondent urged that these constitutional violations stemmed from the Rule's requirement that two
members of the appellate court join in a statement that the case
involves a substantial question which warrants consideration in order to be heard by the supreme court. 90 The court rejected this
contention. 9' In the exercise of its constitutional authority, the
supreme court has created classes of appeals: some as of right, and
some by permission.9 2 The court determined that a rational basis
existed for distinguishing appeals from the Industrial Commission
from other appeals. Appeals from Industrial Commission decisions
already have been subjected to numerous reviews and there is a
strong public interest in speedy resolution.93 Thus, Rule 315(g)
does not serve to deprive litigants of due process or equal
protection. 94
IV.

JURISDICTION

Two supreme court decisions during the Survey year addressed
the issue of whether state courts had jurisdiction to hear certain
employment-related actions. In Pierce v. P..G. & Associates,
Inc.,9 the supreme court ruled that in a suit emanating from the
breach of a collective bargaining agreement under section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act (the "LMRA"), 96 there ex97
ists concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction.
88. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16. Section 16 states that all administrative and supervisory power over the courts is vested in the supreme court. Id.
89. Yellow Cab, 108 Ill. 2d 330, 338, 483 N.E.2d 1278, 1282.
90. Id. at 334, 483 N.E.2d at 1282.
91. Id. at 341, 483 N.E.2d at 1283.
92. Id. at 338, 483 N.E.2d at 1282.
93. Id. at 341, 483 N.E.2d at 1283.
94. Id.
95. 112 11. 2d 535, 494 N.E.2d 482 (1986).
96. Id. at 540-41, 494 N.E.2d at 485 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1985)).
97. Pierce, 112 Ill. 2d at 538-39, 494 N.E.2d at 484.
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The plaintiffs in Pierce, trustees of the Electrical Insurance
Trust, filed a complaint in state court against the defendant employer to recover wage payments and fringe benefits owed the
Trust under a collective bargaining agreement. Upon being sued in
state court, the defendant contended that the federal courts had
exclusive jurisdiction of the action under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 9s The circuit court
agreed with defendants and dismissed the case, a decision which
was upheld on appeal. The supreme court reversed the lower
court's holding and ruled that the LMRA provided for concurrent
jurisdiction in cases arising from violations of collective bargaining
agreements. In connection with the ERISA preemption claim, the
court cited section 514(d) of ERISA: "[n]othing in this subchapter
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair or
supersede any law of the United States. . . .
Thus, to apply ERISA as conferring jurisdiction exclusively on
federal courts would operate to supercede jurisdictional provisions
of the earlier LMRA. 100 Because such invalidation is prohibited
under section 514(d) of ERISA, the plaintiff's section 301 action
could be brought in state court.101
° the Illinois Supreme
In Bartley v. University Asphalt Co., 102
Court held that an employee's claim of tortious civil conspiracy
based upon his union's failure to represent him fairly in grievance
proceedings established by a collective bargaining agreement was
preempted by federal labor law. The employee in Bartley filed a
retaliatory discharge claim against his employer and asserted that
the Teamsters were guilty of civil conspiracy in furtherance of the
retaliatory discharge.1 0 3 The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that his suit for civil conspiracy against the Teamsters was a
distinctly different cause of action from a section 301 suit. Acknowledging that plaintiff's complaint made no mention of federal
98. Id. at 538, 494 N.E.2d at 483 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1985).
99. Pierce, 112 Ill. 2d at 539, 494 N.E.2d at 484 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1985)).
100. Pierce, 112 Ill. 2d at 539, 494 N.E.2d at 484.
101. Id.
102. 111 Il1. 2d 318, 489 N.E.2d 1367 (1986).
103. Id. at 320, 489 N.E.2d at 1368. Plaintiffs earlier had filed a section 301, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a), suit against the two defendants, alleging breach of contract. The complaint stated that his employer had fired him in retaliation for his participation in an FBI
investigation of the defendants, and hence, he was not terminated for "justifiable cause"
as required by the collective bargaining agreements. He accused the Teamsters of not
fairly representing him in contesting his discharge. That initial suit was dismissed as
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and four months later, plaintiffs filed the
instant suit with substantially similar allegations. Bartley, 111 Ill. 2d at 321-22, 489
N.E.2d at 1369.
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law, the court determined that the complaint essentially stated the
basis of a section 301 action.
The United States Supreme Court had held that federal laborcontract law preempts state tort actions that are substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a labor contract between the
parties. 104 Relying on this holding, the court in Bartley concluded
that any state rule that purports to define the meaning or scope of a
term in a labor contract is preempted by federal labor law.10 5
Thus, even though the plaintiff's claim was framed as a state tort
suit for civil conspiracy, the court concluded that it actually alleged a violation of a collective bargaining agreement,10 6 a cause of
action which congress intended for federal court. The court in
Bartley thus held that plaintiff's claim was preempted.107
V.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

During this Survey year the Illinois courts made few developments in the area of unemployment compensation. One significant
supreme court case concerned the responsibility of a buyer of a
business regarding the unemployment insurance obligations of the
seller. 10 8 In another case, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District slightly expanded the type of claimant who is eligible
for unemployment benefits.109

In Woodliff v. Department of Labor,10 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Second District held that a carpenter who left his job
to become self-employed was entitled to unemployment insurance
benefits. Generally, an individual is ineligible for benefits when he
has left work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to
his employer.11 ' One exception to this rule is a person who leaves
work voluntarily to accept other bona fide work. 2 The court reasoned that the plaintiff's independent carpentry work was bonafide and that "work" need not involve an
employer-employee rela3
self-employment."
be
may
but
tionship
104. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1985).
105. 111 Ill. 2d at 330, 489 N.E.2d at 1371-72.
106. 111 Il. 2d at 331-32, 489 N.E.2d at 1373-74.
107. Id. at 333, 489 N.E.2d at 1374.
108. Pavlakos v. Department of Labor, 111 Ill. 2d 257, 489 N.E.2d 1325 (1985).
109. Woodliff v. Department of Labor, 139 Ill. App. 3d 539, 487 N.E.2d 645 (2nd
Dist. 1985).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 540, 487 N.E.2d at 646.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 541-42, 487 N.E.2d at 647.

Loyola University Law Journal

680

[Vol. 18

In Pavlakos v. Department of Labor,14 the supreme court held
that section 2600 of the Unemployment Insurance Act,115 requiring a purchaser of a business to obtain verification that the seller
has no unemployment insurance obligations, is not an impermissible classification nor invalid as special legislation. This section further requires that the buyer will be responsible for paying the
seller's unemployment insurance obligations if the buyer does not
withhold sufficient funds at the beginning of the transaction. 1 6 After upholding the constitutionality of section 2600, the court in
Pavlakos refused to apply the doctrines of estoppel or laches
against the collection of unpaid unemployment insurance from the
purchaser who failed to obtain a receipt of payment from the
seller. 17

VI.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

During the Survey year, there was a notable absence of significant state decisions in the field of employment discrimination. In
Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. Human Rights Commission.,"8 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District

held that an employer's refusal to hire an amputee for a sheetmetal
worker's position without testing his ability to handle the job was
against the public policy as articulated in the Illinois Constitution. 119 The court stated that an employer must focus his inquiry
on whether the handicapped person applying for the job could perform the particular work involved. 2 ' An applicant may not be
rejected simply because the employer in good faith thinks a person
with that
particular handicap could not adequately perform the
1

job.

12

In Woodward Governor Co. v. Human Rights Commission, 22 the
Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District held that settlement of an employment discrimination case may occur after a final
order is entered by the Human Rights Commission. The court in114. 111 Ill. 2d 257, 489 N.E.2d 1325.
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 750 (1985).
116. Id.
117. Pavlakos, III Ill. 2d at 265, 489 N.E.2d at 1328.
118. 138 Ill. App. 3d 71, 485 N.E.2d 33 (4th Dist. 1985).
119. Id. at 74-75, 485 N.E.2d at 36 (citing ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19). Article I, section
19 provides that all persons with physical or mental handicaps shall be free from discrimination unrelated to their ability in the hiring and promoting practices of any employer.
ILL. CONST. art. I,§ 19.
120. Id. at 75, 485 N.E.2d at 36.
121. Id.
122. 139 I11.App. 3d 853, 487 N.E.2d 653 (2nd Dist. 1985).
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dicated that settlement could occur any time before a decision of
the circuit court is issued. 2 3 In Woodward, the Human Rights
Commission issued an order against Woodward, compelling it to
end its discriminatory dress policies. While the matter was pending for administrative review before the circuit court, the parties
settled. Woodward then requested the Human Rights Commission
to withdraw its order regarding the said discrimination; the Commission refused. Woodward sued to compel the Commission to
approve the settlement agreement pursuant to the terms of the Illinois Human Rights Act and the Commission's own regulations. 24
In ruling for Woodward, the court reasoned that the Act reveals a
legislative intent to promote settlement of discrimination
charges. 25 The plain language of the statute indicates that settlement can occur at any time before a final order of a trial court is
issued. 126
VII.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

Two Illinois cases decided during the Survey year addressed issues concerning public employment. In Thaxton v. Walton, 127 the
supreme court held that a wrongfully discharged municipal employee is entitled to recover full compensation measured from the
date he was illegally removed from his position. Under Thaxton, a
public body may no longer reduce the back pay to which the
wrongfully discharged employee is entitled by the salary paid to his
replacement.1 28 Because the Illinois Municipal Code 129 contains no
provision governing back pay for wrongfully discharged municipal
employees, the court concluded that the Personnel Code 30 is applicable.31 The Thaxton court reasoned that allowing a set-off for a
de facto replacement would give a municipality little, if any, incen32
tive to resolve the issue of just cause for the original discharge.
123. Id. at 857-58, 487 N.E.2d at 656.
124. The Illinois Human Rights Act provides that a settlement of any charge on
complaint may be affectuated at any time upon agreement of the parties. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 68, para. 7-103(a) (1983). The Illinois Human Rights Commission Regulation
also addresses settlement. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 2520.510-.540 (1985).
125. Woodward, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 857, 487 N.E.2d at 656.
126. Id.at 857-58, 487 N.E.2d at 656.
127. 106 I11.
2d 513, 478 N.E.2d 1350 (1985).
128. Id.at 517, 478 N.E.2d at 1352-53.
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 1-1-1 to 11-151-5 (1985).
130. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, para. 63b101-63bl19 (1985).
131. Thaxton, 106 I11.2d at 517, 478 N.E.2d at 1352.
132. Id. at 519, 478 N.E.2d at 1353.
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In County of Kane v. Carlson,I3 3 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the Second District upheld the constitutionality of several provisions of the Public Labor Relations Act (the "PLRA").' 34 The
court held that the provisions of the PLRA requiring collective
bargaining with respect to wages and other conditions of employment and a grievance procedure in collective bargaining agreements, when deputy circuit court clerks are at issue, was not an
overly burdensome infringement on the powers of the judicial
branch of state government. Thus, the appellate court held that
the PLRA did not violate the separation of powers provision of the
Illinois Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that appointed deputy circuit court clerks did not fall within
any of the enumerated exceptions to coverage, but were public employees within the purview of the PLRA. 3 The court, however,
did certify its findings of constitutionality to the supreme court.136
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, Illinois courts addressed several issues
affecting Illinois Labor Law. Of particular significance, supreme
court decisions further delineated the boundaries of the retaliatory
discharge cause of action. Both the Illinois Supreme Court and
appellate courts considered disputes relating to workers' compensation. Finally, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District upheld the constitutionality of several provisions of the Public
Labor Relations Act.

133.

140 I11.App. 3d 814, 489 N.E.2d 467 (2nd Dist. 1985).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, paras. 1602, 1604, 1607, 1609 (1985).
135. Carlson, 140 Ill. App. 3d at 817-18, 489 N.E.2d at 471.
136. Id. at 821, 489 N.E.2d at 473. On the court's own judgment with three justices
concurring, a case may be certified to the supreme court of Illinois pursuant to the provisions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 316 and article VI, section 4 of the Illinois Constitution as involving questions of such importance that they should be decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court. ILL. S. CT. R. 316, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, para. 316 (1985); ILL.
CONST. art. VI, § 4.
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